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Introduction 
  
The United States Supreme Court stands today as an arbitrator of political 
disputes and modern liberties, a “storm center” of moral and political controversy.  The 
modern Supreme Court’s decisions regarding contraception, marriage, and abortion incite 
debate concerning the judiciary’s appropriate role in the United States’ democratic 
structure.  Even after more than two hundred years since its establishment, the role of the 
Court remains unclear.  Those who oppose the Court’s current practice argue that it has 
encroached upon the realm of the legislature and has ventured far from the Constitution’s 
intended meaning.  Proponents, however, declare that certain rights, such as the right to 
privacy, are embedded within provisions of the Constitution itself; therefore, it is the 
responsibility of the Court to rule upon.   
With this thesis, I attempt to answer the normative questions surrounding this 
debate: what is the proper role of the Supreme Court; furthermore, if it is not the role of 
the Supreme Court to answer such substantive questions, then to whom should this 
responsibility be deferred?   
It is argued that through the expansion of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court recreates itself as a “super-legislature.”  The 
Court after all, establishes many of the rights that are the cause of such questions.  
Through the Due Process Clause, the Court rules that there was the right to privacy, the 
right to marry an individual of another race, and the right of a woman to choose whether 
to have an abortion.  Yet, nowhere within the Constitution do these rights appear.  
Through a historical analysis of the Court’s rulings on the Due Process Clause, I show 
how the Court, using its own opinions, as well as the language of the Constitution, has 
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transformed one clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to encompass much more than a 
procedural right.  I do not disagree with the notion that the Supreme Court has established 
itself as part judiciary, part legislature.  However, by considering the methods of proper 
interpretation offered by both formalistic and non-formalistic adherents, and the 
questions of legitimacy each poses, I believe that the current practice of the Supreme 
Court is effective, and most importantly has been incorporated into the political culture of 
American democracy.      
 
The Principles of the Fourteenth Amendment 
Freedom is a vague word, one that does not denote any particular application, nor 
designate one particular meaning.  Yet, within the culture of the United States, it is a 
highly valued belief.  The freedom to practice one’s religion, the freedom of speech, and 
the freedom to assemble as one chooses are all listed explicitly in the First Amendment of 
the United States Constitution.  But what about the freedom to enter into contracts, or the 
ability to use contraceptives with one’s married partner, or even the ability to engage in 
homosexual acts within one’s own home?  These rights will not be found in the 
Constitution, or at least in the explicit text of the document.  The rights are found, 
through the rulings of the Supreme Court, to be encompassed within the word liberty in 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Amendment reads in part: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or  
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
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“It is surprising but true that many of the principles of constitutional liberty most 
prized by Americans were created, not by the founders, but by the Supreme Court during 
this century.  At the very least, the understandings that have given those principles their 
current life are very recent creations” (Sunstein, 1993, p. 97).  The concept that the word 
“liberty” within the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses rights not written directly into 
the Constitution is known as substantive due process.  The idea surrounds the belief that 
there are fundamental rights, rights that are so central to an individual’s life that there is 
no process fair enough, or due enough, to take them away.  The Due Process Clause 
therefore, protects individuals against governmental infringement upon these rights.  
There is no guideline or provision that establishes the Due Process Clause involves a 
substantive meaning.  It has, however, become standard practice to view the clause in this 
light through the rulings of the Supreme Court.   
 “Since the late 1880’s the Supreme Court has flirted with substantive due 
process, sometimes affirming, at other times rejecting, the due process clauses as a 
restraint on the exercise of legislative power” (Keynes, 1996, p. x).  Initially, the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was only accepted as a right of procedure.  
The notion suggests that the government, or more specifically in terms of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s application, the State, cannot deprive individuals of their “rights without 
going through an established judicial procedure- that is prior to the forfeiture of these 
rights” (Keynes, 1996, p. 36).   
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is interpreted by the Court as a 
grant of procedural rights, as described above.  The interpretations of the same clause 
within the Fourteenth Amendment, however, venture far from this standard.  The 
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argument for the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive interpretation is partly based upon 
the difference in language and content of the two amendments (Keynes, 1996).  
Provisions issuing instructions for jury indictments, double jeopardy, and self-
incrimination are all found within the Fifth Amendment.  Therefore, at its base the 
Amendment is primarily concerned with the establishment of procedural rights.  The 
Fourteenth Amendment however contains no such provisions.  At its core is the 
protection from state interference in the personal rights of individuals.  One of the most 
significant differences between the amendments that provides substantive interpretation 
is the specific addition of the “privileges and immunities” clause.  This guarantee is seen 
by some as a purposeful movement away from procedure and towards the protection of 
actual freedoms granted to individuals.   
 
Defining Liberty 
The intended nature of the judiciary is that of interpreter—a distinct difference 
from the legislative, or the “law-making” body.  When reading Articles I, II, and III of 
the Constitution, it is apparent that the drafters of the Constitution provided little 
substance to define the methods of the judiciary system.  Article III, which establishes the 
judiciary, vests judicial authority over all cases that arise through constitutional issues as 
well as the laws of the country.  In comparison to Article I, which establishes the 
legislature, the guidelines for the judiciary branch are sparse and general.   
The difference in the substance defining each branch is indicative of the initial 
fear that the true power laid within the executive and legislative branches.  Those 
branches that were more promising of increasing their power were given more direct 
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guidelines to prevent such excess.  In fact, initially the judiciary was seen as the “least 
dangerous” of the branches.  In Federalist 78, Alexander Hamilton outlined the intentions 
of the proper role of the Court:  
Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must perceive,  
that, in a government in which they are separated from each other, the judiciary,  
from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political  
rights of the Constitution. (The Avalon Project) 
This is because, as stated by Hamilton, the judiciary is dependent upon the other two 
branches—the Courts have no power of the purse, nor does it have the ability to control 
the army.  Rather, the judiciary’s decisions are conditional upon the laws the other 
branches create and enforce. 
 It is important to note, however, that Hamilton also understood the potential 
power that lay within the judiciary.  The Courts were designed, according to Hamilton, to 
“be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature” in order to control the 
legislature from creating authority not designated by the Constitution (The Avalon 
Project).  The result is ultimately the protection of citizens’ liberty.  However, Hamilton 
added a warning within Federalist 78 that is not often mentioned: “liberty can have 
nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have every thing to fear from its union 
with either of the other departments” (The Avalon Project).  He also warned that if the 
Courts “be disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would 
equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body” (The Avalon 
Project).  The proper role of the judiciary, according to Hamilton, is that of a distinct 
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body, “For I agree, that ‘there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from 
the legislative and executive power’” (The Avalon Project).    
 Today, the judiciary has established itself as a powerful, if not the most powerful, 
branch of government.  A democratic society is one that involves “the people,” 
deliberating and ultimately deciding how they should be governed.  Instead, the 
American people of today rally upon the steps of the Supreme Court awaiting their 
answer to political questions.   
Through its written opinions, the Supreme Court has essentially given meaning to 
the words life and liberty found within the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.  A historical analysis of the evolution of due process shows the 
role that the Court has carved for itself within the democratic process.  These intended 
interpreters have instead created liberty rights.  The Court has, through a case-by-case 
basis, begun to define liberty, and ultimately taken this process out of the hands of the 
people.  The lines separating the legislature from the judiciary have begun to blur.   
 
 
A Historical Look at Substantive Due Process 
There is no question of the expansive role the Supreme Court now plays in the 
protection of fundamental rights.  The Court is consistently considered to be the venue 
that answers questions regarding the liberties of citizens within the United States, a role 
that has been greatly expanded through a case-by-case basis.  It is a role the Court creates 
for itself through its own interpretations. 
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  Early in its interpretations the Supreme Court limited the reach of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Butcher’s Benevolent Association v. Crescent City Livestock Landing & 
Slaughter House Company, 83 U.S. 36 (1873), known as The Slaughterhouse Cases, 
forced the Court to rule upon the construction of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due 
process and equal protection clauses. The industrial revolution transformed the lives of 
millions of individuals and the cities they resided within, however, there were many 
negative side effects as well.  “For example, the Louisiana state legislature claimed that 
the Mississippi River had become polluted because New Orleans butchers dumped 
garbage into it” (Epstein & Walker, 2004, p. 580).  In order to rectify the situation, the 
state created a state-based slaughterhouse, the Crescent City Livestock Landing & 
Slaughter House Company.  In effect, the state had created a monopoly over the industry, 
forcing all butchers to pay state-set prices in order to use the state facility.  The butchers 
collectively sued the organization on several levels, arguing that it was involuntary 
servitude as outlined in the Thirteenth Amendment, that the act also violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment, by depriving the butchers of the privileges and immunities of 
citizens of the United States and the equal protection of the law.  They argued that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s language was broad enough to encompass all citizens (Epstein 
& Walker, 2004, p. 580).  However, the Supreme Court addressed the question in another 
manner.   
By analyzing the context under which the amendments were passed, the Court 
ruled in a 5-4 decision that the state’s actions did not violate either amendment.  Justice 
Miller, writing the opinion of the Court, regarded the “pervading spirit” of the articles.   
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He writes:  
…on the most casual examination of the language of these amendments, no one  
can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose found in them all, lying at 
 the foundation of each, and without which none of them would have been even  
suggested; we mean the freedom of the slave race…It is true that only the 
fifteenth amendment, in terms, mentions the negro by speaking of his color and 
his slavery.  But it is just as true that each of the other articles was addressed to 
the grievance of that race, and designed to remedy them as the fifteenth.  
(Slautherhouse, 83 U.S. 36) 
 
Furthermore, the Court established limitations upon the application of the Due 
Process Clause.  The opinion held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
simply imposes the same restrictions upon the states as the clause imposes upon the 
federal government within the Fifth Amendment, that is, restricting infringement upon 
citizens’ procedurally-based rights. 
 In dissent, Justice Stephen J. Field notes, “liberty to contract one’s labor or 
services was but a means to ensure every person’s fundamental right to develop his full 
human potential” (Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. 36).  Justice Field continued to write that the 
United States’ free government is one “under which the inalienable right of every citizen 
to pursue his happiness is unrestrained, except by just, equal, and impartial laws” 
(Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. 36).    
The Court initially took a hard-lined stance against the idea of a substantive 
element to due process, as evidenced in The Slaughterhouse Cases opinion.  But, why did 
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Justice Miller and the majority of the Court reject the substantive view of due process.  It 
has been stated that, “In large measure, he did so because he did not want to see the Court 
become a “super-legislature,” a censor on what states could and could not do” (Epstein & 
Walker, 2004, p. 584).  This characterization could not be more indicative of future 
opinions of the Supreme Court.   
 
The Creation of Economic Substantive Due Process 
Four years after its decision in the Slaughterhouse Cases, a series of cases were 
brought forth by railroad, warehouse, and public-utility companies pushing the Court to 
declare state interaction in private business unconstitutional.  The first of these cases was 
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).  The question in Munn revolves around Illinois’ 
legislation that fixed the maximum rates grain elevators could charge.  Because the grain 
elevators were owned by private industry, the owners questioned whether the law 
violated their due process rights.  Although the Court upheld the state’s actions, the actual 
opinion did encourage the idea of substantive due process.  In the opinion, Justice Waite 
writes that the Fourteenth Amendment did not prohibit state interference in private 
property “when such regulation is necessary for the public good.”  Use by the public 
deemed a business open to public regulation, however the state could only interfere for a 
reasonable purpose.  The actual ruling opened the ideas of liberty and property to real 
value: private is therefore protected and impervious to regulation.   
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Once again, Justice Field expressed his notions of individual liberty in the dissent, 
stating that “liberty” as written in the Fourteenth Amendment has greater meaning.  He 
writes: 
…something more is meant than mere freedom from physical restraint or the  
bound of a prison.  It means freedom to go where one may choose, and to act in 
such manner not inconsistent with the equal right of others, as his judgment may 
dictate for the promotion of his happiness; that is, to pursue such callings and  
avocations as may be most suitable to develop his capacities, and give to them 
their highest enjoyment.  The same liberal construction which is required for the 
protection of n all particulars in which life and liberty are of any value, should be 
applied to the protection of private property.” (Munn, 94 U.S. 113) 
 
It wasn’t until twenty-years later when Justice Field’s dissenting opinions were echoed as 
the Court’s majority opinion.   
The Court gradually expanded its review of economic rights beginning with the 
case Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).  In Allgeyer, the Court was forced to 
answer whether liberty, as written in the Fourteenth Amendment, included the freedom of 
contract.  Allgeyer & Company was accused of violating a Louisiana statute when it 
purchased insurance from a firm in New York.  The statute prohibited out-of-state 
insurance companies from conducting business in Louisiana if the company did not 
maintain at least one place of business within the State.  Allgeyer’s attorney argued that 
“the term liberty included the right to use and enjoy all “endowments” without constraint, 
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and the term property included the right to acquire it and engage in business” (Epstein & 
Walker, 2004, p. 592). 
In its holding, the Court reviewed past attempts to give meaning to the word 
“liberty” and called upon an argument very similar to that of Justice Fields’ twenty-years 
earlier.  According to the Court, liberty means the freedom to pursue one’s livelihood: 
The act done within the limits of the state under the circumstance of this  
case…we hold a proper act, one which the defendant were at liberty to perform  
and which the state legislature had no right to prevent, at least with reference to 
the Federal Constitution. (Allgeyer, 165 U.S. 578) 
 
The court agreed that that Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment protected 
against state interference in an individual’s right to contract “by reading the term liberty 
to mean economic liberty” (Epstein & Walker, 2004, p. 594).   
 At this point in the Supreme Court’s history, there is a clear shift in the Court’s 
approach to due process—no longer would the Court only apply the procedural 
interpretation to the Due Process Clause.  In thirty-two years, since its Slaughterhouse 
Cases decision, the Court gradually transitioned from a judiciary, to a “superlegislature,” 
using the standards from Munn to decide upon whether state legislation was “reasonable” 
and therefore constitutional.  Nowhere in the Constitution is the right to contract stated, 
however the Court held that it existed, and that it was indeed protected through the Due 
Process Clause.  This reasoning affirmed one of the most controversial economic 
substantive due process cases: Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).   
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 The ruling in Lochner, created a new standard for the Court.  It began what is 
known today as the Lochner Era, a period lasting roughly 30 years where the Court 
invalidated close to 200 pieces of legislation “using a laissez-fair approach towards 
economics” (Phillips, 2001, p.11). 
 In Lochner, the Court invalidated a New York law that prohibited bakery 
employees from working more than ten hours per day or sixty hours per week.  The State 
of New York had initiated the legislation through the use of its police powers, as a 
protection of the health of workers and consumers.  The owner of a New York bakery, 
Joseph Lochner, challenged these assertions on the basis that the legislation deprived him 
of his freedom of contract and of his property rights protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Issuing the opinion of a 5-4 Court, Justice Peckham reaffirms that the 
freedom of contract is a liberty protected by the Due Process Clause:    
The mandate of the statute, that ‘no employee shall be required or permitted to 
work,’ is the substantial equivalent of an enactment that ‘no employee shall 
contract or agree to work’…The statute necessarily interferes with the right of 
contract between the employer and employees, concerning the number of hours in 
which the latter may labor in the bakery of the employer.  The general right to 
make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual 
protected by the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution…The right to 
purchase or to sell labor is part of the liberty protected by this amendment.  
(Lochner, 198 U.S. 45) 
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The state law had taken away the ability of the employer and employee to contract upon 
their own terms.  The Court ruled that the state law created a contract with the bakery 
employees, leaving the owner out of the process. 
The Court held that a state does have the ability to exercise its police powers, but 
only if it is a reasonable exercise of this power.  In other words, the Court is the sole 
institution that is able to question and judge the “reasonableness” of state actions, 
creating a larger role for itself.  What may be even more significant to note is the exact 
language of the majority opinion.  Continually throughout the opinion, Justice Peckham 
writes such statements as, “we think” and “in our judgment,” conveying that the justices 
have based their conclusions upon personal opinions, rather than sound legal principles.   
 
Breaking Away from Lochner Economics: The Nationalization of the Bill of Rights  
Facing the Great Depression in 1929, the American people began to turn toward 
their government to restore order to the broken economy.  “The Court continued to 
vindicate economic autonomy, while state legislatures attempted to promote collective 
action.  The Supreme Court’s laissez-faire constitutionalism was beginning to collide 
with the policies of the emerging welfare state” (Keynes, 1996, p. 121).  The justice’s 
defense of an individual’s economic liberty and property tended to directly conflict with 
President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal policies, which called for a large amount of 
governmental interaction.  After facing confrontations with President Roosevelt regarding 
the implementation of the New Deal policies, “a new majority virtually abdicated the 
protection of economic liberty and property rights to Congress and the state legislatures” 
(Keynes, 1996, p. 130).  In West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), the Court 
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abandoned it’s reasoning in Lochner, ruling that minimum wage laws did in fact violate 
an individual’s liberty of contract as found in the Fifth Amendment and applied to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.   
 From this case forward, the Court adopted a “double standard of judicial review,” 
establishing a route that would enable the expansion of liberty to include many of the 
fundamental rights we enjoy today.  “The Supreme Court abandoned the protection of 
economic rights to legislative will, but it continued to employ the substantive due process 
reasoning of Lochner in articulating such unenumerated rights as family, marital, and 
reproductive privacy” (Keynes, 1996, p. 131).In a little more than a year after the ruling 
in Parrish, footnote number four of Justice Stone’s opinion in U.S. v. Carolene Products, 
Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), foreshadowed “that prejudice directed against discrete and 
insular minorities may call for ‘more searching judicial inquiry.’”  Provisions within the 
First and Fourteenth Amendment that guarantee equal access and “legal equality to 
discrete racial and ethnic minorities, Stone argued, are indispensable to ordered liberty” 
(Keynes, 1996, p. 134).   
This opinion is evidence of a significant shift in substantive due process 
reasoning.  “Unlike earlier substantive due process reasoning, Stone’s double standard 
would insulate new, unenumerated personal freedoms from governmental intrusion” 
(Keynes, 1996, p. 135).  It is important to note as well that this would only be made 
possible if the rights and liberties protected by the Bill of Rights were applicable to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Until this point, the Bill of Rights only 
applied to the federal government, as a protection from the legislative and executive 
branches; the states were not obligated to follow the provisions.  As Justice Stone wrote 
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footnote number four, he was well aware of the current movement of the Court towards 
such a stance.   
At first almost casually, then with greater theoretical acuity and awareness, the  
Supreme Court inaugurated a line of decisions that would eventually make the 
 guarantees of virtually the entire Bill of Rights effective against the states through 
 the due-process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Kelly, Harbison, & Belz,  
1991, p. 516) 
 
It took the first initial step in this process with its opinion in Gitlow v. New York, 268 
U.S. 652 (1925).  In Gitlow, the Supreme Court asserts: 
For the present purposes, we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of  
the press-which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgement by 
Congress-are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the 
states. (268 U.S. 652; Kelly et al., 1991, p. 517) 
 
The trend continued seven years later in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), 
when the Supreme Court first included criminal procedure guarantees of the Bill of 
Rights into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Court held that 
the state of Alabama violated the Due Process Clause when the defendants in a rape trial 
were not given the opportunity to secure counsel in their defense (Kelly et al., 1991).  
The right to council for a defense is found within the Sixth Amendment. 
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 Justice Cardozo’s opinion for the Supreme Court in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 
U.S. 319 (1937), provided the necessary framework for the nationalization of the Bill of 
Rights (Kelly et al., 1991).  The opinion indicated that some of the provisions of the Bill 
of Rights, through a “process of absorbtion,” become part of the due process of law of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Justice Cardozo creates a hierarchical structure of rights.  
According to the opinion, some rights were more important than others:  “they were the 
“fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and 
political institutions” (Palko, 302 U.S. 319).  These rights, Cardozo continued, existed on 
a “different plane of social and moral values” (Palko, 302 U.S. 319).   
 At the forefront of this movement was Justice Black, who in many dissenting 
opinions expressed his theory of the total incorporation doctrine.  According to Justice 
Black, the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had incorporated the entire Bill of 
Rights into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The protections of the 
Bill of Rights would not only apply to the federal level of government, rather, the 
provisions would also apply to the state governments as well.  He expresses this theory 
most fully in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947):  
I cannot consider the Bill of Right to be an outworn 18th Century ‘strait 
jacket’…In my judgment the people of no nation can lose their liberty so long as a 
Bill of Rights like ours survives and it basic purposes are conscientiously 
interpreted, enforced and respected so as to afford continuous protection against 
old, a well as new, devices and practices which might thwart those purposes…To 
hold that this Court can determine what, if any, provisions of the Bill of Rights 
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will be enforced, and if so to what degree, is to frustrate the great design of a 
written Constitution.  
 
 Justice Black’s asserted that liberties protected by the Due Process Clause were 
not stagnant.  In his dissent he explains that the process of interpretation involved the 
possibility of the “contraction or extension of the original purpose of a constitutional 
provision thereby affecting policy” (Adamson, 332 U.S. 46).   This definitive break from 
the “original purpose” of a constitutional provision affords the Court the ability to guard 
rights through substantive due process.  It is evident in Justice Cardozo’s opinion in 
Palko that the Supreme Court declares the importance of some rights over others. It 
selectively chooses what is a liberty right, and what is not.    
 
A Turning Point: The Court’s Ability to Legislate Liberty 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) 
establishes the right to privacy.  Until the Supreme Court issued its decision in 1965, this 
right had never been declared to exist by the Court.  Griswold involved “the Court’s 
review of a nineteenth-century relic—an 1879 state law that made the use of artificial 
birth control illegal in Connecticut” (Johnson, 2006, p.235).  Under the law, those who 
counseled or provided artificial contraceptives to others were also conducting criminal 
behavior.  The law was actually rarely enforced, and individuals and couples were able to 
purchase over-the-counter contraceptives.  “The most pronounced effect of the law was 
that it outlawed birth control clinics and, therefore, discouraged the practice of birth 
control by the state’s poorest women” (Johnson, 2006, p. 235).  The events leading up to 
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the Griswold case were actually prompted by the Court’s decision in another case four 
years earlier.  The case, Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), questioned the very same 
Connecticut law the Court ruled on in Griswold.  
The Justices dismissed the potential challenge to the Connecticut law in Poe on 
the basis that the case only involved its “threatened and not actual application” (The Oyez 
Project).  Because those bringing the case had not actually been charged with violation of 
the law, the Court found there was no sense of “immediacy which is an indispensable 
condition of constitutional adjudication” (Poe, 381 U.S. 479).   
The Poe decision was “not a complete loss for the advocates of birth control.  
Within the decision itself lay seeds that would generate its destruction” (Bartee, 2006, p. 
196). In dissent, Justice John Marshall Harlan II lays the groundwork affording the 
creation of a right to privacy.  Justice Harlan’s dissent, thirty-three pages in length, 
“attacked the plurality’s argument on two major grounds: justiciability and 
constitutionality” (Barteen, 2006, p. 197).  To Justice Harlan, the state of Connecticut 
was “intruding upon the most intimate details of the marital relation with the full power 
of criminal law…In sum, the statute allows the states to enquire into, prove, and punish 
married people for the private use of their marital intimacy” (Poe, 381 U.S. 479).  He 
called for a truly substantive view of the Due Process Clause.  Justice Harlan argues that 
the actual liberties guaranteed to the people were not limited to those written in the text of 
the Constitution:    
The full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be 
found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere 
provided in the Constitution. This 'liberty' is not a series of isolated points pricked 
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out in terms of the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; 
the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches and  
seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a 
freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints.  
 
This broad application of liberty would serve as the foundation in the argument for 
privacy rights. 
  The Poe decision failed because the law had not actually been enforced.  Five 
months after the Court released the Poe decision, however, the rule was enforced.  This 
action and the incidents immediately prior directly led to Griswold (Bartee, 2006).  
Estelle Griswold, the executive director of the Planned Parenthood League of 
Connecticut and C. Lee Buxton, a Yale University physician, opened a birth control 
clinic in New Haven, Connecticut in 1961 (Johnson, 2006).  As both expected, the 
authorities closed the clinic after only one day of operation.  Griswold and Buxton were 
convicted and fined $100 each.  Appealing to the Supreme Court, their attorneys argued 
that the law “violated the privacy of the two defendants and unnamed married couples 
who sought contraceptive services from the clinic” (Johnson, 2006, p. 235).  Unlike Poe, 
the law was finally invoked. 
In its 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that although the Constitution does 
not directly name a right to privacy, “the various guarantees within the Bill of Rights 
create penumbras, or zones, that establish a right to privacy.  Together, the First, Third, 
Fourth, and Ninth Amendments create a new constitutional right, the right to privacy in 
marital relations” (Griswold, 381 U.S. 479).   
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 Justice Douglas, in his majority opinion of the Court, used precedent set by the 
Court during the Lochner Era to reaffirm the expansion of liberty.  For example, in Meyer 
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Court held invalid a Nebraska statute that 
prohibited teaching of modern foreign languages to elementary school children.  The 
majority opinion, written by Justice Reynolds, states “the liberty guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment… included the right to bring up one’s children according to the 
dictates of individual conscience.”  Following this same argument, in Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), the Court also invalidated an Oregon law that required 
children between the ages of eight and sixteen to attend public school.  “The statute, said 
Justice McReynolds, destroyed property right in private schools and violated the right of 
parent to educate their children as they saw fit” (Kelly et al., 2001, p. 516).  To Justice 
Douglas in Griswold, this means, “the State may not, consistently with the spirit of the 
First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge” (381 U.S. 479).   
The right to privacy established through the “penumbras” of the Constitution is 
“sufficiently broad” to provide a constitutional right to engage in sexual acts with 
contraceptives.   
Justices Black and Stewart, who both wrote dissenting opinions, were vehement 
in their argument that the Court had overstepped its Constitutional authority.  Both agreed 
that even though the law itself was “a silly law,” it was not the place of the Court to 
decree that such state action went against provisions of the Constitution. 
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 Justice Black writes:  
I get nowhere in this case by talk about a constitutional “right of privacy” as an 
emanation from one or more constitutional provisions.  I like my privacy as well as the 
next one, but I am nevertheless compelled to admit that government has a right to invade 
it unless prohibited by some specific constitutional provision. (Griswold, 381 U.S. 479). 
 
 Justice Stewart’s separate dissent echoes that of Justice Black’s.  It is also 
remarkably similar to the warning left by Hamilton in Federalist 78.  In his dissent, 
Justice Stewart states that the majority opinion has inserted its own will instead of solely 
judging the constitutionality of the state’s actions: 
I think this is an uncommonly silly law….But we are not asked in this case to say 
whether we think this law is unwise, or even asinine.  We are asked to hold that it 
violates the United States Constitution.  And that I cannot do.  
(Griswold, 381 U.S. 479).  
 
It is important to note the contradictory nature of a section within the majority 
opinion.  In an attempt to preempt attacks of its authority to define liberty rights, similar 
to the remarks of Justice Stewart, the Court quickly dismisses the expansion of its role in 
the governmental structure.  Justice Douglas wrote, “We do not sit as super-legislature to 
determine the wisdom, need and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, 
business affairs, or social conditions” (Griswold, 381 U.S. 479).  In effect, however, this 
is exactly what the Supreme Court has become.  In Griswold, the Supreme Court deemed 
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essential a right that was not enumerated by the Constitution to the federal or state 
governments or to the people.  By holding the Connecticut law unconstitutional, the 
Supreme Court itself was dictating what state actions were prohibited.  The Supreme 
Court, not only the legislature, has the ability to create law.  Griswold, though 
controversial, instituted the framework for future civil liberties. 
 
Modern Substantive Due Process 
Only two years after Griswold was decided, the Supreme Court was faced with 
defining whether a person’s liberty involved the ability to marry someone of another race.  
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) questions the constitutionality of a state law that 
criminalized interracial marriages. 
Antimiscegenation laws were part of the “legal legacies of slavery” and “lasted 
well into the twentieth century in many parts of the country” (Mauro, 2000, p. 98).  The 
antimiscegenation law in the state of Virginia made it illegal for individuals of different 
races to marry.  The law went as far as preventing any resident of Virginia from marrying 
in another state and then returning to reside together in the Virginia.  In 1958, Richard 
Loving, who was white, and Mildred Jeter, who was part black and part American Indian, 
drove to near-by Washington, D.C. and had a formal wedding ceremony.  No laws 
against interracial marriages existed within this part of the country.  Five weeks after 
their return to the state of Virginia the couple was arrested.  Knowing they were in clear 
violation of the law, the couple accepted a plea bargain forcing them into exile from the 
state for a period of twenty-five years (Wallenstein & Mooney, 2006). 
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In its arguments to the Supreme Court, the state argued “that the laws did not 
violate “equal protection” because they punished blacks and whites equally for the crime 
of intermarriage” (Mauro, 2000, p. 98).  The Court’s ultimate decision however 
disagrees.  In their unanimous decision, the Justices rule that the state of Virginia’s anti-
miscegenation law is a clear violation of the Equal Protection Clause.  The Court further 
established that this law was also a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment; the couple had been deprived their liberty rights.  In the opinion, the Court 
holds that marriage is a fundamental right, essential to a person’s existence: 
To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial 
classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of 
the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to 
deprieve all the State’s citizens of liberty without due process of law…Under our 
Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not to marry, a person of another race 
resides with the individual, and cannot be infringed by the State.  
(Loving, 388 U.S. 1) 
 
The Court’s new role was carved.  In Loving, the nine justices call upon the all-
encompassing nature of the word liberty to define extremely personal issues, those 
involving sexual acts and marriage.  The established precedent set forth in Griswold 
creates a right to privacy in a very general sense.  At this point in the Court’s history, it 
has not established what the right encompasses or the extent privacy prohibits 
governmental interference.  One of the most controversial modern liberty decisions of the 
Court was its opinion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  In this case, the Court takes 
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steps to determine the limitations to the right to privacy.  The Court ultimately holds in 
Roe that, “A woman’s right to an abortion is part of her constitutionally protected right of 
privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment, although the right is not absolute” (Mauro, 
2000, p. 166).  The ruling ultimately invalidated statutes within 46 different states (The 
Oyez Project). 
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Blackmun determined the point when 
governmental interference in a woman’s privacy right is constitutional by defining 
allowable state interactions during the trimesters of a woman’s pregnancy.  During the 
first trimester, a woman has “total autonomy over the pregnancy” (The Oyez Project).  
During the second trimester, regulation of abortion is allowed to protect the woman’s 
health, but during the final stages of a pregnancy, a state can outlaw abortions.  
Rather than ending conflict over privacy rights and abortion, the Court’s decision 
had the opposite effect.  The Roe decision has been condemned on moral, religious, and 
legal grounds.  Much of the criticism questions whether a right to privacy exists, and also 
whether this decision should have been left to the states to decide.  Similar arguments are 
brought forward by Justice William Rehnquist in his dissent:  
The decision here to break pregnancy into three distinct terms and to outline the  
permissible restrictions the State may impose in each one…partakes more of 
judicial legislation than it does of a determination of the intent of the drafters of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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Four years after its decision in Roe, the Court again affirmed its ability to prohibit 
state interference in its own definition of liberty.  In Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 
494 (1977), the Court answered whether a housing ordinance, which restricted the 
occupancy of a dwelling to a strict definition of “family,” violated the Due Process 
Clause.  The ordinance prevented those who were not immediate members of a family 
from living within the same home.  The Court ultimately struck down the law, stating that 
it was an "intrusive regulation of the family" without accruing some tangible state interest 
(Moore, 431 U.S. 494). 
Because the right to privacy was established by the Supreme Court, the Justices 
have the ability to tailor the extent that privacy rights may apply.  With their ruling, a 
door was opened to endless possibilities—what could and could not be protected within a 
person’s liberty rights? Justice Blackmun attempted to draw a line regarding abortion in 
his Roe decision: the right is not absolute.  The Court attempted to further limit the 
application of privacy rights in abortion cases when it partially affirmed Roe twenty-years 
later in the case Planned Parenthood v. Casey 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  In Casey, the Court 
created a new standard when reviewing state regulation in abortion.  The state of 
Pennsylvania had amended it abortion control law to contain provisions that required the 
woman to obtain informed consent, or if a minor receive parental approval, and then wait 
twenty-four hours before the abortion procedure could occur.  In its 5-4 decision, the 
Court upheld most of the Pennsylvania provisions through its new “undue burden” 
standard.  This standard “asks whether a state abortion regulation has the purpose or  
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effect of imposing an "undue burden," which is defined as a "substantial obstacle in the 
path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability" (The Oyez 
Project).  
The established precedent thus far in the Supreme Court’s history holds that a 
person has a right to privacy, and therefore a right to have access to contraceptives, and 
decide such private matters as whether to have an abortion.  Next, the Court addresses 
whether sexual acts within the closed door of an individual’s own home are protected 
from state interference as well.  Are homosexual acts also private acts, and therefore 
protected through one’s liberty rights?  The Court attempts to answer this question in 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).  In Bowers, the Court determines the 
constitutionality of a Georgian law criminalizing acts of sodomy. 
In 1982, an Atlanta police officer arrived at the home of Michael Hardwick, a gay 
man.  The officer had a warrant for Hardwick’s arrest after he had not attended his 
scheduled court appearance to answer to charges of drinking in public.  Hardwick’s 
roommate allowed the officer into the house and directed him to Hardwick’s bedroom.  
The officer found the bedroom door partially open, exposing Hardwick and his male 
partner engaging in oral sex.  The two were immediately arrested and charged with 
violating the state’s sodomy law (Bartee, 2006). 
In oral arguments before the Supreme Court, Hardwick’s attorney related the right 
of homosexuals to engage in sodomy to “the fundamental rights of family intimacy that 
the Court had declared in other contexts” (Mauro, 2000, p. 15).  In a 5-4 opinion, 
however, the Court upheld the Georgia law.   
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  In his opinion for the Court, Justice White argues that the right to commit acts of 
sodomy did not fall within established standards previously granted privacy rights 
adhered to.  Per the decision in Griswold, protected rights are “deeply rooted in the 
Nation’s history and tradition” (478 U.S. 186).  The Court previously established in 
Palko v. Connecticut that rights not identified within the Constitution are protected only 
if the right was “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” (478 U.S. 186).  Justice White 
and the Court found that neither applied to Bowers.  
Instead, the Court drew a line in its own power, stating that it would not be 
pressured to create a new right.  Justice White writes: 
The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with 
judge-made constitutional law having little or not cognizable roots in the language 
or design of the Constitution…There should be, therefore, great resistance to 
expand the substantive reach of those Clauses, particularly if it requires redefining 
the category of rights deemed to be fundamental.  Otherwise, the Judiciary 
necessarily takes to itself further authority to govern the country without express 
constitutional authority. (Bowers, 478 U.S. 186) 
 
It is apparent that the Court believed it would be venturing far into the realm of 
the legislature if it were to afford privacy rights to homosexual acts of sodomy.  The 
opinion states that this action would have created a new right.  Yet, hadn’t the Court 
established such a process was possible through its opinion in Griswold and affirming 
privacy rights in Roe?  Justice White’s reasoning seems quite inconsistent with the actual 
practices of the Court itself.  Thus far the nine justices have defined liberty as containing 
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a right to access contraception for private sexual acts.  There is a postscript added to that 
freedom by the Court: the right to privacy in sexual acts only pertains to those who are 
heterosexual. 
Seventeen years later, the Court would again address the constitutionality of 
sodomy laws.  The end result, however, would be quite different.  The Bowers decision 
was ultimately overturned when the Supreme Court issued its opinion in the case 
Lawrence and Gordon v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  The Texas statute in question in 
Lawrence banned oral and anal sex for same-sex couples.  In a 6-3 opinion, the Justices 
hold that liberty rights include the right of homosexual persons to choose whether to 
engage in sexual acts with someone of the same-sex. 
Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct 
protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, 
and a decision on the latter point advances both interests…When homosexual 
conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is 
an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public  
and in the private spheres. The central holding of Bowers has been brought in 
question by this case, and it should be addressed. Its continuance as precedent 
demeans the lives of homosexual persons. (Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558) 
 
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Anthony Kennedy warns of the “far-reaching 
consequences” restrictions such as the Texas law have upon the “the most private human 
conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home.” He writes: 
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The Nation's laws and traditions in the past half century are most relevant here. 
They show an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to 
adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining 
to sex. (539 U.S. 598) 
 
Analysis of the Court’s Decisions 
When the Court ultimately held that a right to privacy existed in 1965, it opened 
the door to countless personal issues.  The same standards have been used to push for the 
legality of same-sex marriages, as well as the establishment of a person’s “right-to-die.”  
It would seem that the day has passed when the United States Supreme Court could be 
considered the “least dangerous” of the branches of government as once stated by 
Alexander Hamilton.   As evidenced through its history, the Court’s only boundaries are 
the limitations that it dictates for itself in its own opinions.   
As shown, substantive due process licenses the Justices of the Supreme Court to 
decide what rights are fundamental in the United States.  Initially, the Court set a 
boundary to the interpretations of the Due Process Clause (The Slaughterhouse Cases).  
As the United States grew, the Supreme Court altered this view to include economic 
substantive due process (Munn, Allgeyer, Lochner, West Coast).  Then, the Court 
incorporated part of the Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment (Carolene Products, Gitlow, Powell, Palko, Adamson).  The incorporation 
doctrine was also a gradual shift towards a reading the Due Process Clause to include 
substantive elements.   
 
29 
The Court has not returned to any of its previous views of procedural or economic 
due process.  In fact in one opinion alone, the Justices declared that it would no longer 
decide economic cases.  In Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1955), 
the Court states:  
The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth  
Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial 
conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a 
particular school of thought. We emphasize again what Chief Justice Waite said 
in Munn v. Illinois, ‘For protection against abuses by legislatures the people must 
resort to the polls, not to the courts.’  
 
 Although the Court has abandoned economic due process, it has simply taken 
another route to protect against “abuses by legislatures”—substantive due process.  The 
history of substantive due process shows the Courts ability to selectively decide what 
rights are fundamental, and therefore protected.  Substantive interpretation has also led to 
the creation of privacy rights (Griswold, Loving, Roe, Moore, Lawrence).    
  If the Court has rooted these decisions within the Due Process Clause itself, then 
how can the Court be compared to a “superlegislature”?  Such a comparison is made 
because of the finality of the Supreme Court’s decisions.  For example, as previously 
stated, the right to privacy is not written into the actual Constitution.  Once the Court held 
the right to privacy exists (Griswold), the elected branches of government may not 
change the scope the right applies.  The only available option is to override the Court 
through constitutional amendment—a highly impracticable option as constitutional 
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amendments must receive two-thirds approval from both houses of Congress and ratified 
by at least three-fourths of the states.  If the people of the United States disagree with the 
Supreme Court, there are few options they may take to override the Justices’ decisions.  
“Through substantive due process, the court can directly legislate rights” (Goldstein, 
1995, p. 279).  The Supreme Court has greatly increased its power within the 
governmental system because it alone has the ability to expand substantive due process to 
encompass what the Justices deem as fundamental. 
In majority opinions, the Justices have been insistent that its legitimacy as a 
judiciary is immediately in question when a Justice inserts his or her will for that of 
constitutional provisions.  Even so, the Court has increased its authority and taken the 
ability to decide out of the hands of the citizens—the Court has bypassed the democratic 
process so central to the United States’ governmental structure.   
 
 
Emerging Practice: The Unwritten Constitution 
The United States Constitution is ultimately the supreme law of the land; there is 
no other law able to supersede its authority.  Today this understanding is a “potentially 
powerful challenge” to the Court’s legitimacy (Fallon, 2001, p. 111).  Each time the 
Court reaffirms its own definition of liberty, it is unavoidably prevailing over the rights 
asserted within the written Constitution.  How then is the Court able to disregard its 
obligation to the Constitution?   
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Perhaps the dilemma can be best explained through the work of Richard Fallon, 
who has developed the concept that “the United States has an unwritten as well as a 
written constitution” (2001, p. 111).  In his book, Implementing the Constitution (2001),  
Fallon argues that there are sources outside of the written Constitution that share 
constitutional authority.  Fallon writes: 
trying to imagine American constitutionalism without the written Constitution is 
like trying to imagine Hamlet without the prince.  It would be equally misguided, 
however, to think that we could understand American constitutionalism by 
reference to the written Constitution alone. (2001, pp. 125-126) 
 
Outside sources recognized by the unwritten constitution include: the authority of judicial 
precedent, historical practices, and adjudicative norms. As Fallon asserts, judicial 
precedent and historical practices “may sometimes dictate different results to 
constitutional cases than would be reached under what otherwise would be the best 
interpretation of the written Constitution” (2001, p. 111).  It is the unwritten constitution 
that also provides the norms structuring judicial decision-making.   
In his writing, Fallon differentiates the two types of constitutions through the use 
of capital and lowercase letters.  The U.S. Constitution is ultimately deferred to in all 
questions arising law and state constitutions, therefore Fallon shows the prominence of 
the written Constitution, by using a capital “C” at the beginning of the word 
“constitution.”  To indicate that other sources must defer to the U.S. Constitution, Fallon 
represents the unwritten constitution’s inferiority by referring to it as the “small-c” 
constitution.  “I should emphasize that the unwritten constitution, in both of its aspects, 
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supplements or mediates the written Constitution, rather than displaces it” (Fallon, 2001, 
p. 111).  Opinions based upon the unwritten constitution can, “at least be reconciled with 
the language of the written Constitution, even if reconciliation sometimes depends on 
tenuous or even specialized interpretations (as in the case of “substantive due process” 
adjudication)” (Fallon, 2001, p. 111-112).  The unwritten constitution requires the 
Supreme Court to make “practical, predictive, and sometimes tactical judgments” that 
complement the Constitution and its authority (Fallon, 2001, p. 111).  Words like liberty 
and due process found in the Constitution are broad and do not denote one specific 
meaning; therefore, such words ultimately demand interpretation by the Court.   
The belief that another, albeit unwritten, constitution exists gives credence to the 
Court’s ability to interpret, or rather as Fallon describes, “implement,” liberty.   As stated, 
the unwritten constitution draws its authority, in part, through the judicial precedent set 
by the Court.  In the rule of stare decisis the judiciary will uphold the opinions of 
previous cases, as well as previous Courts.  The Supreme Court has mostly adhered to 
stare decisis in modern substantive due process—the Court established that there are 
substantive elements to Due Process, and it continues to follow this line of thinking.  To 
Fallon, the authority of precedent cannot be distinguished from the authority of the Court 
itself.  “The Supreme Court’s authority to endow its precedents with power to trump what 
otherwise would be the best interpretation of the written Constitution cannot be derived 
from the written Constitution alone” (Fallon, 2001, p. 115-116).  Fallon therefore 
associates practices of the Court to a higher level of influence—what could be considered 
practice is now seen as constitutional authority.   
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The strong relationship between precedent and the Court’s practice in Fallon’s 
arguments, however, illustrates a major flaw within the legitimacy of the Court.  Fallon 
argues that the unwritten constitution is merely a supplement to the written Constitution.  
He also argues that the unwritten constitution grants constitutional authority to these 
outside sources.  In effect then, his argument is inconsistent.  If constitutional authority is 
granted to other sources, then the supremacy of the Constitution is weakened.  When 
other sources are given constitutional authority, they no longer need to be reconciled with 
the written Constitution.  For example, according to Fallon, precedent is one of the 
outsides sources granted constitutional authority by the unwritten constitution.  As 
previously reviewed, stare decisis requires the Court to uphold prior judicial rulings.  
When this practice is continually followed the Court is actually deferring to prior 
holdings, and not the actual Constitution.  It can be argued that the original precedent 
itself is based upon the Constitution, and therefore later precedent follows as such.  This 
of course does not explain situations when the Court uses the precedent to expound upon 
an originally granted right.  In these cases, the Court followed judicial precedent.  If this 
line of thinking continues, we may come to a point when we must ask ourselves whether 
the holdings of the Court are still rooted in the actual written Constitution.  What is really 
guiding the Justice’s decisions—the supreme law of the land, or prior judicial holdings?  
If it is prior holdings, then the supremacy of the Constitution is in questioned; further, the 
legitimacy of the Court itself can also be questioned because it is granted authority within 
the written Constitution.     
Fallon’s model may be closer to the actual practice of the Supreme Court than one 
may think.  This flaw is actually represented within the holdings of the Court today.  As I 
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demonstrate above, many of the freedoms we enjoy today are not listed within the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Instead, many liberty rights come about through precedent the 
Court has established.  The Court’s decision in Griswold establishes the right to privacy.  
As described, the Court found that “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have 
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and 
substance” (Griswold, 381 U.S. 479).  However, before the Court could rule privacy 
exists, it first found in a series of cases that specific areas of the Bill of Rights are 
protected through the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore enforced at the state level.  
If the Court had not established precedent nationalizing the Bill of Rights, then protection 
against state infringement of a person’s privacy could not be “rationalized” in the manner 
that it is.  The Court also follows the rule of stare decisis in cases after the Griswold 
decision.  Modern substantive due process cases not only affirm a right to privacy exists, 
but also expound upon the specific guarantees found to be encompassed within this right.   
When the Court builds upon established precedent as it has done in privacy rights—to 
include contraception, abortion, homosexual acts— has the Court actually concluded 
these rights exist through provisions of the Constitution?  The Court essentially 
establishes an “unwritten” Constitution.  Being unwritten, it is therefore subject to 
adaptation, to context, and judicial interpretation. 
Although Fallon’s concept rings true to the actual practice of the Court today, it 
also brings a greater issue to the forefront: Is this how the Constitution should be 
interpreted?  Furthermore, if it is not the role of the Supreme Court to answer such 
questions, then whose responsibility is it? 
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Methods of Interpretation 
The fact that the Court has departed from the actual text of the Constitution has 
fueled the debate regarding the Supreme Court’s proper role in American democracy.  
Should the Court act as a true independent judiciary, or does the American system of 
government require the Court to behave politically as it has in substantive due process 
decisions?  Scholars are divided among three classifications of thought; each proposes 
what the Court’s proper methods of interpretation should involve, and the role the Court 
should play.  These classifications are: objective, realist, and subjective.   
Those residing within the objective realm of judicial theory believe a justice 
should remove him or herself from the interpretation.  I describe below the originalist 
perspective, which describes how objective interpretations should be applied.  Realists, 
however, call for judicial restraint in constitutional matters, deferring much responsibility 
to the elected branches.  Subjective interpretations are quite different from the two other 
classifications of judicial thought.  Those who view the Court subjectively, believe the 
Justices should act as policy makers, interpreting the Constitution to adapt to the modern 
world in which we live.   
 
 Objective Interpretations: The Originalist Perspective 
The act of being objective is an attempt to refrain from influencing, and being 
influenced by, personal feelings, prejudice, or other interpretations.  Objective judicial 
interpretation follows this same approach.  Originalism is a purposeful movement to 
detach the Court from inserting the Justice’s will into their interpretations of the 
Constitution.  “In a sentence, originalism holds that the Supreme Court should interpret 
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the Constitution to reflect the “original understanding” of those who wrote and ratified 
relevant language” (Fallon, 2001, p. 13).  Those of originalist thought believe, when the 
Constitution was adopted, the framing generation bound themselves and future 
generations to the meanings, values, and principles that they believed the words of the 
Constitution embodied.   
The major tenants of originalist thought are often best exemplified through the 
writings and opinions of former judge, and Supreme Court nominee, Robert H. Bork.  
Within his book, The Tempting of America (1990), Bork argues to an extent that the 
Constitution itself is law.  It is the role of the judge to only reinforce the original 
understanding, not to incorporate new, present-day principles into the text.  Bork writes, 
“The ratifiers of the Constitution put in place the walls, roofs, and beams; judges preserve 
the major architectural features, adding only filigree” (2001, p. 5).  Originalist justices 
construe constitutional truths by deciphering the intended meaning behind the words of 
the Constitution (Epstein & Walker, 2004).  
To an originalist, the current interpretation of the Due Process Clause is 
unfounded.  According to Bork, there is no original understanding that lends to an 
understanding that the Due Process Clause contains substantive elements.  Instead, the 
Court established through initial due process cases, such as The Slaughterhouse Cases, 
that the clause was only a grant of procedural rights.  “Thus, a judge who insists upon 
giving the due process clause such content must make it up.  That is why substantive due 
process, wherever it appears, is never more than a pretense that the judge’s views are in 
the Constitution” (Bork, 1990. p. 43).   
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Proponents of originalist interpretation believe that justices must hold true to the 
intended meanings of the Constitution because of their designed role as “guardians” of 
the people’s liberties.  To Bork, the federal courts were designed to preserve the 
Constitution and the authority of the people.  Unlike legislators, Supreme Court justices 
cannot be held accountable through elections and the democratic process because of their 
life-tenured positions.  If the Court were to be accountable to the people through 
elections, the people could choose to deny basic rights to individuals at their whim.  The 
only method to ensure that the people are “guarded from our guardians” is for justices to 
set aside their own views and only follow what is written within the Constitution and 
what the Framers intended (Bork, 1990, p. 5).  Justices must be “bound by the only thing 
that can be called law, the principles of the text, whether Constitution or statute, as 
generally understood at the enactment” (Bork, 1990, p. 5).     
For Bork, the fact that the Supreme Court ventures away from this method of 
interpretation in substantive due process opinions, only brings the Court deeper into the 
realm of politics.  Bork calls this the “American orthodoxy”—that is, people widely 
expect the Supreme Court to create new or destroy old standards of liberty, therefore the 
Court continues this behavior.  In doing so, the Court assumes a legislative power that is 
superior to any other branch within the government.  The problem lies within the 
superiority of the Constitution and the finality of the Court itself.  It is the Court’s role to 
interpret the meaning of the Constitution and apply it to decisions.  Therefore, whenever 
the Court issues an opinion, “the democratic process is at an end,” for there is no other 
structure of the government that has been granted the power to state what is within the 
supreme law of the land (Bork, 1990, p. 3).   
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To Bork and other originalists, there is no question that issues such as abortion are 
morality questions that should not be decided by judges.  Because the protection of the 
right to privacy and the protection of a woman’s right to have an abortion were not 
written into the text of the Constitution, then such matters should not be attempted by the 
Court.  Bork addressed this issue in a dissenting opinion he wrote while sitting as a 
federal judge, he included the passage in his book:  “[W]e administer justice according to 
law.  Justice in a larger sense, justice according to morality, is for Congress and the 
President to administer, if they see fit, through the creation of new law” (Bork, 1990, p. 
6).   
The intention of the Framers was a tripartite system of government, each with 
differing responsibilities.  The reliance upon the judiciary branch, and not those elected 
by the people, is a clear step away from the intentions of those who wrote and ratified the 
Constitution.  Justice Peckham, in his opinion in Lochner, “defended liberty from what he 
considered to be ‘a mere meddlesome interference,’ asked rhetorically, ‘[A]re we all…at 
the mercy of legislative majorities?’”(Bork, 1990, p. 49).  According to Bork, the answer 
to this question is a resounding yes.  There must always be deference to the original 
understanding of the Constitution, and therefore each of the three branches of 
government.  The legislative majorities are synonymous with that of the basic outline of 
the American structure, and the intent of our representative democracy (Bork, 1990).    
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Criticism of Original Intent: The Intent and Beliefs of a Past World 
In modern practice the Supreme Court has answered Justice Peckham’s rhetorical 
question quite differently than Robert Bork.  While the notion of following the original 
Framer’s intent may ensure a strict limit on the judiciary’s power, it also leads to 
questions of how the actual application of such views can be implemented in the modern 
world.  When the U.S. Constitution was adopted in 1789, the world was a different place 
than the one in which we live today.  The document itself was crafted by an exclusive 
group of land-owning white males, who lived in an agrarian society that upheld the belief 
that human beings were property.  Specific groups, such as women, African Americans, 
and other minorities, were purposefully excluded from the words of the Constitution by 
its authors.  The Founding generation regarded Great Britain as the largest power in the 
world; they had no need for things such as Medicare; and they would never hear the 
words global warming.  The entire premise of originalism is based upon the intent and 
beliefs of a past world.  The fact is the Founder’s could never have even imagined many 
of the specific issues that challenge the political process today.  Possibly even more 
unimaginable, is the prospect that one can actually determine what the Framer’s 
intentions were.  Justice Brennan, one of the more prominent activist Supreme Court 
Justices,” “It is a view that feigns self-effacing deference to the specific judgments of 
those who forged our original social compact.  But in truth, it is little more than arrogance 
cloaked as humility” (“Contemporary Ratification,” 1985).   
Originalist perspective is intended to remove the Justice from inserting his or her 
views into interpretations of the Constitution.  However, this view fails to recognize that 
Justices still have much interpretative latitude in using this approach.  It must be 
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remembered that the Founders themselves were not a coherent collective, speaking in 
only one voice.  The drafters of the Constitution disagreed on many matters when 
planning the American system of government.  If intentionalism is followed as directed, 
then the Justice inserts their influence over which Framer’s intentions get priority over 
others.    
The “consequences” of following an originalist perspective “are not obscure” 
(Sunstein, 1993, p. 97).  Liberty could not receive substantive protection and any 
discrimination would only receive rational basis review, essentially ensuring its 
validation (Sunstein, 1993).  The originalist perspective cannot conform to the actual 
practice of the Court today.  “A great deal of existing constitutional doctrine—including 
much that we are likely to think most important—cannot be justified on originalist 
principles” (Fallon, 2001, p. 15). 
Originalism is a theory that cannot conform to today’s practices in full.  “A return 
to a narrowly described ‘original understanding’ would result in the elimination, in one 
bold stroke, of many constitutional safeguards” and principles (Sunstein, 1993, p. 98).  
Instead, it is a theory that proposes how the Court should behave, offering the Court’s 
“appropriate” role (Fallon, 2001, p. 16).  In the face of substantive due process, which 
thus far has proven to have no end in sight for the Court, the originalist theory does draw 
a line and limits the Court’s power. 
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Realist Interpretations: Judicial Restraint 
Realists use a pragmatic approach to explain how the judiciary branch and the 
Supreme Court should behave.  Realists derive their concept of judicial interpretation 
from the basic outline of the tripartite system of American government.  To realist, the 
judiciary should defer to the other branches of government—in other words, use judicial 
restraint— so that the intended separations between the three distinct branches do not 
disappear.  Judicial restraint is a theory of judicial interpretation that maintains the Court 
should create limitations in its own power.  This means the Supreme Court should refrain 
from striking down laws unless they are obviously in conflict with the Constitution.  If a 
constitutional decision must be made, it should be as narrowly tailored as possible.   
The approach increases the prominence of the old political question doctrine, 
“According to this doctrine, matters of political discretion (that is, policy choices), are 
left to the (legislative and executive) branches elected by the people, or to the people 
themselves in their constitution-writing mode” (Goldstein, 1995, p. 276).  The concept 
argues for government by consent of the governed.  Judicial interpretations, therefore, do 
not answer political matters, rather legal questions. 
Such an approach is offered by Leslie Friedman Goldstein in her “Consent-
Oriented Constitutional Theory I” (1995).  Goldstein’s core argument for judicial 
restraint is derived from the political question doctrine.  She points to the three branches 
of government—two elected, one not—to distinguish whether the Court has the ability to 
rule on substantive elements of the Constitution.  To Goldstein, “If the Court were to be 
free to announce new rights as it went along, there would be no reason for not treating it 
as a third house of the legislature” (p. 286).  The distinct difference of the electoral 
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process differentiates the judiciary from the legislative branch.  The true power of the 
Court does not derive from the Constitution itself, rather from the people of the United 
States as a whole.  According to Goldstein, the people consent to the Constitution at two 
different levels.  The higher level is “that of constitution formation through the original 
ratification and the amending process” of Article V (1995, p. 284).  The idea is that when 
the formal Constitution was adopted, the people, and their successive generations, retain 
the power to create rights and change the Constitution through formal processes.  The 
lower level is the people’s consent to the elected majorities and legislative policies.  
According to Goldstein, the people express their will through elected representatives 
whom they choose to enact laws on their behalf.  Therefore, when law is enacted, the 
people themselves are consenting and expressing their will—it should “count as the voice 
of the people themselves” (Goldstein, 1995, p. 284).   
Goldstein then points to three different levels of authority in the American system 
of government.  At the top is the formally adopted Constitution, “the voice of people at 
its firmest.  It is to be honored even at the cost of frustrating —the bottom level—
particular legislative majorities” (Goldstein, 1995, p. 285).  Between these two levels “is 
the amorphous, fluid world of constitutional politics—the ongoing dialogue between the 
people and the Supreme Court about the meaning of their constitutional law” (Goldstein, 
1995, p. 285).  To Goldstein and other realists, the people consent to a written 
constitution so that others will know what it is they have agreed to.  That is why the 
Constitution is to be treated as the highest law and upheld—not altered—by the Supreme 
Court.  The Court must simply enforce the will of the people by “exercising text-based 
judicial review” (Goldstein, 1995, p. 284). 
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The realist approach defers much authority to the elected officials of the people.  
There are clauses within the Constitution, however, that demand interpretation—the word 
liberty, for instance, could be all inclusive of many aspects of life.  If the Court were to 
defer to the legislature on all of these matters, is the Court fulfilling its responsibility to 
interpret the Constitution?  Goldstein answers that there are certain instances within the 
Constitution that require active judiciary interpretations.  However, because the American 
system is a government by the people, “it makes sense to “adopt judicial-power-
constraining readings of those infinitely expandable clauses” (Goldstein, 1995, p. 286).  
The Supreme Court should interpret these aspects of the Constitution in such a way that 
the “channel rather than unleash judicial power, limiting the judiciary to implementing 
some expression of the will of the sovereign people.” (Goldstein, 1995, p. 286).   
According to this approach then, substantive due process is a gross appropriation 
of the judiciary’s power.  “So-called substantive due process turns the justices from 
interpreters of a legal text (albeit an opaque, amorphous, malleable one) into grand 
prohibitors of legislation who may prohibit any law that strikes them as a bad one on the 
grounds that the particular freedom invaded by this law is fundamental in American 
society” (Goldstein, 1995, p. 279).  Referring specifically to the Court’s decision in 
Griswold and Roe, Goldstein argues that substantive due process allows the Court to 
abandon the Constitution and its role as interpreters.   
And it was doing so in its grand prohibitor mode, with no apparent  
embarrassment at the idea that it needed no referent in the constitutional text for 
its assertion that there is a fundamental right to choose to have an abortion.  The 
justices were obviously doing something other than merely interpreting law, and 
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they were doing it in ways that had tremendous impact on society.  (Goldstein, 
1995, p. 279) 
 
A realist Justice would most likely have answered such “moral” questions in a 
quite different manner, instead deferring to the state and allowing the people to 
electorally choose.  This of course, similar to originalism, raises questions as to 
implementing such an approach in today’s world.  If realist thought points to the 
legislature as the policy maker, then could this approach not also lead to the elimination 
of rights we the people hold as fundamental?  According to Goldstein and the political 
question doctrine, moral issues, such as abortion and homosexuality, should be left to 
legislators to decide because they are the direct representatives of the people.  These 
representatives however are the elected officials of the majority, and not the citizenry as a 
whole.  To this extent, proper Congressional legislation reflects the majority, the closest 
reflection to our democratic republic system.  Issues of morality, however, “involve 
questions of value on which reasonable people differ” (Sunstein, 1993, p. 101).   
While judicial restraint may very well ensure the upholding of the democratic 
majority process, it must be noted that it is primarily the majority who is most likely to 
take away the rights of the minority in order to maintain the status quo. Therefore, there 
is the possibility that rights would be taken away.  Attempts by the Supreme Court may 
instead represent the minority’s sentiment, and prevent the majority from eliminating the 
rights from the minority of the population.  Another question I also posed by the 
application of the realist perspective: Does an election truly represent a majority of the 
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people?  Further analysis of this question is contained within the section titled “Deference 
to the Majority.” 
 
Subjective Interpretations: The Judicial Statesperson 
The subjective classification of judicial interpretation theories is quite distinct in 
its approach than the other two classifications.  Those who do not adhere to an originalist 
or judicial restraint perspective are often referred to, in a very general sense, as activists.  
Subjective approaches, unlike originalists and realists, believe that proper interpretations 
of the Constitution require a justice to consider beyond the “narrowly understood” 
original understanding of the document (Sunstein, 1993, p. 98)—a justice cannot strictly 
adhere to the written law of the land.  “Text has no meaning apart from the principles 
held by those who interpret it, and those principles cannot be found in the text itself” 
(Sunstein, 1993, p. 101).  Instead, “Meaning is created, rather than found, and hence a 
function of one’s perspectives” (Sunstein, 1993, p. 114).  The justices will always insert 
their own views into the Constitution.   
Many proponents of subjective, or activist, interpretation also believe that the 
Supreme Court itself cannot escape its political nature, that it is a political institution.  
This approach emphasizes the human nature of the justices of the Court—justices, just as 
any other person, are swayed by the changes within the wider political system and the 
culture of the country (Kahn, 1994).  To those within this realm of interpretation, it is 
unfounded that one document, written over 200 years ago, could contain provisions 
outlining all subsequent privileges and rights in an ever-evolving world.  As stated by 
Justice Brennan (“Contemporary Ratification,” 1985), “For the genius of the Constitution 
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rests not in any static meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in 
the adaptability of its great principles to cope with current problems and current needs.”  
Instead, the justices must base their holdings upon the principles the document itself 
embodies, not only what is written.   
There are several main theories that have emerged involving a subjective 
perspective.  Perhaps the strongest rival to originalism has been brought forth by the legal 
philosopher Ronald Dworkin.  Dworkin characterizes the Supreme Court as a “forum of 
principle” (Fallon, 2001, p. 3).  Similar to originalists, Dworkin argues that the Court’s 
role should involve determining the Constitution’s true meaning.  Dworkin goes further, 
however, to argue that the Court “should equate constitutional meaning with norms, 
values, or principles that the Constitution embodies” (Fallon, 2001, p. 4).  The role of the 
justice has been expanded through Dworkin to find the true understanding of the broad 
principles within the Constitution—to act as judicial statespersons, making policy from 
the provisions of the Constitution.   
The core of this theory equates interpretation by the Court with an obligation to 
enforce the fundamental rights of the people.  “To the idea of the fundamentality of 
rights, Dworkin conjoins the notion that ours is a Constitution of principle, the full 
meaning of which cannot be derived directly from the intent of the framers or even from 
a narrow parsing of the text” (Fallon, 2001, p. 27).  Dworkin argues that the Constitution 
contains principles, or moral directives, designed to guide the nation.  Additionally, he 
maintains that these principles can be found in other sources beyond the written 
Constitution.  “Rather, a principle counts as a constitutional principle if it would appear 
in the philosophically best explanation of the written Constitution and of surrounding 
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practice and judicial precedent” (Fallon, 2001, p. 27).  The act of interpreting these 
principles leads to truth, the truth of all citizens’ fundamental rights.   
 The “Forum of Principle” theory circumvents one of the main arguments brought 
forth against originalism—the Founders could never have accounted for every specific 
issue that would face future generations.  This theory grants the justices true interpretive 
powers.  Instead of adhering to only a strict notion of the specific rights granted, the 
Constitution can be adapted to conform to problems of the current generation.  The 
adaptation of a document into a fluid idea is not unlike the Supreme Court’s modern 
interpretations of the Due Process Clause.  The justices hold that liberty is all-
encompassing of many fundamental rights.  As stated by Justice Peckham in the Allgeyer 
opinion: 
The liberty mentioned in that amendment means, not only the right of the citizen 
to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but 
the term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment 
of all his faculties. (165 U.S. 578) 
Increasing industry within the country forced the justices to recognize in Allgeyer that the 
concept of due process had to change with the needs of the times, not to remain stagnant.  
This is the stance of subjective interpretations—the Justices must be flexible in his or her 
interpretations of the Constitution to fulfill their role as arbitrators of justice.   
 
Criticism of the “Forum of Principle” Theory 
Dworkin’s concept itself is promising as an explanation of why the Court is able 
to adapt the Constitution to the modern times.  The theory itself, however, has many 
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flaws in practice.  Dworkin’s theory defers much faith into the nine Justices of the 
Supreme Court who are mere mortals and, by no such means, any more apt to adhere to a 
moral certitude than another being.   
The argument is one based upon philosophy, not of legal reasoning.  If the 
Supreme Court were a “Forum of Principle,” then the Court could arbitrarily define any 
liberty right without adhering to constitutional principles or legal concepts (Fallon, 2001).  
Some argue that the Court has already done so in terms of its due process decisions.  Yet, 
each opinion thus far called upon provisions within the Constitution or adhered to 
established precedent in some sense.  Because of the strong reliance upon philosophy, 
Dworkin’s theory raises serious questions as to this interpretation’s effect upon the 
supremacy of the Constitution.  In this particular viewpoint, the Court’s rulings should 
embody the true meaning of the Constitution.  Through Dworkin’s theory however, the 
Court is able to side-step the Constitution.  If the Court is able to create law without 
referring to the Constitution, then isn’t the Court essentially stripping the Constitution of 
any authority over law?  Even more perplexing then, is the legitimacy of the Supreme 
Court itself, which is granted its authority within Article III of the Constitution.  These 
questions are quite similar to those that have been raised in regards to the objective 
classification, or the originalist perspective.   
 
 
The Court’s Appropriate Role 
 It is apparent that any question of appropriateness in terms of the Supreme 
Court’s use, or in some opinions, their abuse, of power is hinged upon its legitimacy.  But 
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what is this term, and why is it so important?  According to Justice William J. Brennan, 
Jr., at the center of the legitimacy debate is: 
…what the late Yale Law School professor Alexander Bickel labeled, “the 
counter-majoritarian difficulty.” Our commitment to self-governance in a 
representative democracy must be reconciled with vesting in electorally 
unaccountable Justices the power to invalidate the expressed desires of 
representative bodies on the ground of inconsistency with higher law.  Because 
judicial power resides in the authority to give meaning to the Constitution, the 
debate is really a debate about how to read the text, about constraints on what is 
legitimate interpretation. (“Contemporary Ratification,” 1985) 
 
 The legitimacy claim is used often, but rarely defined in the context of these 
arguments.   
For the most part, legitimacy argument refers to concerns about, and ultimately 
assert or imply answers to, a compound question such as: ‘By what moral right 
does the government, or an institution of the government such as the Supreme 
Court, hold the power that it holds, and by what moral right does it then exercise 
those powers in a particular way?’ (Fallon, 2001, p. 118) 
 
Ultimately, how does the Supreme Court have the power to decide these moral issues if 
they are not implicit within the written text of the Constitution?  In other words, what 
enables the Court to create, and then follow, the unwritten constitution referred to by 
Fallon.   
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 The Legitimacy of the Unwritten Constitution 
The answer to questions of the Supreme Court’s legitimacy is not clear.  As I 
demonstrate above, substantive due process has taken the Court far away from the 
provisions of the written Constitution.  Each time it choose to expand liberty rights, an 
“unwritten” constitution is followed.  If this is so, then the Supreme Court has 
overstepped its power and the people are under no obligation to adhere to its rulings.  
Today, although the people may disagree with the Court, the people do not agree that its 
decisions must not be followed; the Court’s decisions are adhered to.  Perhaps, then the 
questions of legitimacy can be answered through an analysis of the unwritten constitution 
that the Court follows.  Can the legitimacy of the unwritten constitution be argued?   
Nearly everyone assumes the legitimacy of the written Constitution, and 
“everyone also accepts the legitimacy of exercise of power that can be shown to be 
directly authorized by the written Constitution” (Fallon, 2001, p. 119).  The unwritten 
constitution however is questioned, for it is not a formal document and its scope is 
immeasurable.  The principles the unwritten constitution reflects though are also 
accepted.  The Justices themselves argue that there are certain principles embodied within 
many of the written clauses of the Constitution.  I believe the existence of the unwritten 
Constitution is most evident through the Court’s ability to nationalize the Bill of Rights.  
The Supreme Court justified the incorporation of the Bill of Rights through a long, case-
by-case process.  After most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights were found to apply to 
the state-level of government, the Court finds that the pervading spirit of several of the 
Amendments created penumbras, or zones, of unwritten protections.  The zones, I 
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believe, are reflections of the unwritten Constitution.  The Court could not displace the 
written Constitution; rather it used the “zones” as its supplement, to reflect widely 
accepted values.   
The fact remains that a constitution is an outline of the basic structure of 
government; it cannot provide for every possibility.  In fact such a document, as argued 
by Chief Justice John Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819), would be 
beyond the comprehension of the human mind:  
A Constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its 
great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into 
execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced 
by the human mind.  It would probably never be understood by the public.  Its nature, 
therefore, requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, its important object 
designated, and the minor ingredients that compose those objects, be deduced from the 
nature of the objects themselves. 
 It is within the realm of the Court to interpret this written Constitution.  In so 
doing, it will base its decisions upon standards and principles the Constitution reflects, 
though may not be expressly written.  If the Court and the government were unable to 
proceed through this manner—conforming the Constitution to today’s world—then 
society itself could not evolve.  The unwritten constitution allows the United States to 
adapt and evolve as a society, to face modern problems with modern theories.  The 
unwritten constitution can be argued as legitimate because of its relationship with the 
actual Constitution itself.  For example, the nationalization of the Bill of Rights was 
possible because the provisions of the written Constitution, specifically the word liberty, 
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encompassed many of the fundamental rights found in these first ten amendments.  The 
process didn’t directly conflict with the provisions of the Constitution.  Rather, the 
unwritten constitution supplemented the written one—it expounded upon principles 
found within the Constitution.  Because the unwritten constitution reflects the values of 
the written document, is it not also legitimate?  The values that the unwritten constitution 
reflects are widely accepted within society and the American culture.  Acceptance can be 
seen as a form of legitimacy.  Though this is true of practice today, should the Supreme 
Court proceed in such a manner? 
 
Deference to the Majority 
 It is apparent that many of these rights the Court establishes through the unwritten 
constitution epitomize the spirit of America today.  This begs the question: what has 
given the Court the right to decide these emotionally charged issues? Those within the 
realist classification of judicial interpretation, as established earlier, believe that the Court 
has abused its grant of interpretive power; these matters should be deferred to the 
legislators.  The American democratic structure creates a government of and by the 
people.  Therefore, these decisions should be left to the people or their representatives 
whom they freely elect.  This majoritarian process directs that the Court restrains from 
acting as an appropriator of liberties—it should act solely as a guarantee that the process 
of government functions within the scope of the Constitution, rather than interpret 
substantive meaning into the text.  The democratic process would leave the majority of 
the people to define the word liberty.  
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In today’s society, however, the democratic process has actually resulted in a 
disconnect between the American people and their government.  It is argued that the 
legislative process today remains unaware of the majority of the people’s wishes.  The 
governmental structure of modern America is confusing to the average American, while a 
large majority of the population remains apathetic to the actions that the government 
takes.  For example, in today’s society, voter turn out numbers remain stagnant at close to 
half of the voting population.  According to the Federal Election Commission, 56.7 
percent of the voting age population cast a vote in the 2004 presidential election, a slight 
increase from the 51.21 percent turnout in the previous presidential election.  Voter 
turnout is even lower for non-presidential elections.  Compiled statistics by the United 
States Election Assistance Commission show that only 37 percent of the voting age 
population voted in the 2002 Congressional election.  There seems to be no guarantee 
that the true majority is speaking out upon an issue.  Those who are reflected within the 
majority vote seem to be far out-of-center with the population simply because they are 
politically involved.  Can a majority vote today truly reflect the majority of the 
population?   
The role of the Court today may contribute to the apathetic attitude the people 
have towards the government.  Because the Court takes it upon itself to address these 
moral issues, the responsibility no longer requires action from the legislators.  The 
legislator is then able to avoid such matters, never having to make a decision.  If the 
legislators were instead forced to take clear stances upon these moral matters, would the 
apathetic nature of the population transform to a highly involved America?  The reason 
why many citizens are not involved in the process may be a direct result from the lack of 
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any vested interest the citizen has in the electoral process.  If citizens knew that their 
elected officials were forced to make hard-lined stances on issues, the population would 
then have a vested interest to become more involved in the process.   
 
 
Conclusions 
The Democratic theory stresses that our structure of government is a government 
of the people, and therefore, “substantive value choices should by and large be left to 
them” (Brennan).  Deference to the people would render judicial review appropriate only 
as a guarantee that the democratic process functions.  Ultimately, it would restrain the 
Court from expanding it power.  In other words, as Justice Brennan describes, “we would 
protect freedom of speech merely to ensure that the people are heard by their 
representatives, rather than as a separate, substantive value.”  Justice Brennan argues that 
the process of the majority will not ultimately uphold the values inherent in the 
Constitution, an argument with which I do not disagree. 
The democratic theory, although promising of a re-birth of the people’s 
involvement, does not properly reflect the actual protection of all citizen’s liberty rights.  
It is the inherent instinct of the majority to use its power in any method that ensures its 
ability to hold its position of authority.  This often leads to the exploitation of the 
minority.  The concept is not dissimilar from that of Social Darwinism.  Charles Darwin 
proposed theory of natural selection in biology “contributed the notion that in the 
evolution of species the stronger beings survive and the weaker beings perish, so that the 
species acquire traits that permit it to survive and thrive” (Ducat, 1996, p. 513).  This 
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theory was also advanced in early economic substantive due process questions.  The 
Justices employed this theory as a condition for prohibiting governmental interference in 
business; the idea was to “better the human race through unrestricted competition” 
(Ducat, 1996, p. 513).  The actual results were torrid working conditions and low pay.  
As demonstrated in Lochner, the health of the worker—having to work long hours and an 
unsanitary environment—was compromised for the monetary success of business.   
Justice Brennan states, “Unabashed enshrinement of majority will would permit the 
imposition of a social caste system or wholesale confiscation of property so long as a 
majority of the authorized legislative body, fairly elected, approved.”  It is within the 
history of American society that dictates this could happen again, as exemplified in the 
racial clashes of the South in the 1950s and 1960s.  The Constitution does define a 
democratic system, one that defers to the majority.  However, the Constitution also 
outlines certain rights and restrictions upon that majority.  These are evident within the 
Bill of Rights and the Due Process Clause.  “It is the very purpose of a Constitution…to 
declare certain values transcendent, beyond the reach of temporary political majorities” 
(Brennan).  To defer to the majority process would require the people to “rectify claims 
of right” of the minority inflicted through the “outcomes of that very majoritarian 
process” (Brennan).  One must have faith in the democratic process, however that faith 
cannot be blinded to the rights of certain citizens within the population.  The Declaration 
of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights, which shed light upon the 
democratic structure of government, have each “committed” the United States as a 
country of equality, where the rights of all individuals as equals are dignified before the 
authority of law (Brennan).   
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 The majoritarian process cannot guarantee the dignity nor the equality of the 
human spirit.  The question then begs: Why cannot the Supreme Court be the authority 
upon this matter?  The judicial ruling need not defer to the majority, rather it is a check 
upon the majority so that the spirit of the Constitution is not set aside.  Through my 
research, I have read philosophical theories, the opinions of the Justice’s themselves, and 
the historical nature of its practices, all in the hopes of answering whether the Supreme 
Court should define liberty for all of the country.  It is conclusive within my readings that 
the process that exists today has ultimately been incorporated into the political structure 
of American democracy.  It is a system that the people have grown to understand.  
Therefore, should we not let the process lie as it is? 
 It is the responsibility of the judiciary to interpret the Constitution and apply it to 
the world we live today.  “Justices can only read and interpret a document through their 
own understanding, that of a” Twenty-first Century American (Brennan).  The only other 
option is to defer to the democratic process, which in America may not reflect a true 
majority.  This of course is not to say that the nine Justices of the Supreme Court hold the 
ultimate knowledge on all understanding of the Founding generation or the spirit of the 
Constitution itself.  Yet, we as a country defer to the Justices this responsibility.  We 
view them as having a greater understanding of the principles of the country because of 
the position that they hold.  It is the inherent nature of the people to question their 
legislators, whom they vote into office.  It is evident that the Congress is fallible because 
the judiciary structure was created pass judgment upon their laws.  “The Judicial Power 
shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of 
the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority” 
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(Article III, Section 2, The United States Constitution).  The nature of the Supreme Court 
contributes to its acceptance—the Court is the final step of the democratic process.  
Justice Robert H. Jackson aptly stated in the Court’s opinion of Brown v. Allen, (344 U.S. 
443 (1953), “We know that we are infallible only because we are final.” 
Through a historical analysis of the Court’s interpretations of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, it is clear that the Court has departed from the actual 
structures placed within the written Constitution.  Originalist interpretations, such as 
those offered in the writings of Robert Bork, hold that any decision that is not based upon 
the Founder’s intent or the actual written expressions of the Constitution are inherently 
illegitimate.  In reality however, the practical applications of originalist thought are 
flawed.  It is impossible for one document to reflect every possible shift in the nature of 
the country, nor provide great detail in how the document itself should be interpreted.  
“Typically, all that can be gleaned is that the Framers themselves did not agree about the 
application or meaning of particular constitutional provisions, and hid their differences in 
cloaks of generality” (Brennan).  Even when a determination can be made, it is clear that 
the Founders themselves did not value the rights that have become a part of the culture of 
the people within the United States.  They did not provide for the equality of women, nor 
African Americans, nor other minorities, large segments of the population that share a 
vested interest in the practices of the government today.   
Therefore, it is the power of the Judiciary to interpret the Constitution and apply it 
to the culture of today.  However, their interpretations cannot venture so far that they rely 
upon the Justices own personal philosophies, as offered through Ronald Dworkin’s 
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theory of the Court as a “Forum of Principle.”  There must be a strong legal basis to the 
Court’s decisions or it will feign to hold the authority that it does.   
Activism is a balancing act; it is the weighing of the authority of the Constitution 
as supreme, with the Court’s ability to interpret for an ever-changing society in which we 
live.  “To put this another way, the possibilities for collision between government activity 
and individual rights will increase as the power and authority of government itself 
expands, and this growth, in turn, heightens the need for constant vigilance at the 
collision points” (Brennan). 
 With the growing power of corporations and the threat of modern day problems, 
the rights of the individual must be preserved.  Through substantive due process, the 
Court has affirmed that there are certain rights so intrinsic to the very nature of an 
individual that there is no process “due enough” to take them away.  The practice of the 
Supreme Court has upheld the minority’s rights as equal to that of the majority.  The 
modern practice of the Supreme Court is effective, and most importantly, incorporated 
into the nature of our political system.  
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